Video URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpQO-1bqoFw
the jurogan experience you know i've had conversations with people on this podcast that were military people high-level people that were involved in this and they said there's nothing about that extraction that was right no and no one held accountable once again goes back to that accountability piece which what confidence does that give you as the taxpayer that we're going to do something right in uh in the next theater of war not very much confidence there we have proven that we are unable to take the lessons of the past and apply them to the future in a way that is uh is meaningful but really it's the responsibility of those leaders to do that for that e1 e2 e3 that that lower enlisted person who's going to be standing the gate guard who's going to be going out there into these streets or out there into the mountains and uh and taking fire and dealing with a car that's coming up that looks like oh maybe is it bad suspension or is there a family in there or is it packed with explosives right and they're 18 years old and they're out there looking at this thing and have to make a decision and then it pulls up and it detonates or they shoot and guess what it's full of a family like these things are so difficult yeah and they have to live with that for the rest of their lives and they're put in that position by senior level leaders who should have known better on a few things uh specifically to iraq disbanding the iraqi army okay so now you have this entire the trained up military that's essentially now an insurgency okay we have that de-bathification so anyone who had any job in iraq was a bathist so the person that emptied the garbage the people that kept the lights on now debatification those people don't have jobs so now we're fighting an insurgency and we're figuring out how to get the trash picked up how to keep the power on we're building up an entirely new government um so and those those lessons and those those senior level leaders they are responsible for making those decisions just like we would be at the tactical level and they made the wrong decision there and that one those two things right there looking back at
those two things like i don't know it's almost unforgivable that they would make those decisions and not correct it immediately no he created that insurgency because of those two two decisions the hindsight is always 20 20. but we're looking back on the uh afghanistan situation what is the consensus of what would have been the correct approach so we essentially it's not lost on many people that we essentially spent 20 years replacing the taliban with the taliban and well-armed and well-armed yeah with our stuff yeah yeah now why did they do that why do they leave behind all of our i don't know i mean i know when we left iraq uh there were i was at a lower level tactical level so you just kind of hear things i don't know how true it is but how much it costs to bring certain things back rather than leave it there like the gyms that went up all over the place so there's all these gyms all over iraq and you've seen the videos on youtube of the iraqis trying to work out they're pretty funny i think there's quite a few out there uh but you know rather than pack all that up and take it home just leave it um and uh well the gyms are the least concerned i know i'd use that as a as the most basic level but then you apply that to how much does it take to get this helicopter back and that helicopter back and this and that and hey did we think that we were going to turn those over the to the afghans and leave those with them why didn't we blow them up well i think we thought they were going to remain in place as the army that we trained up for the last uh 20 years but that no but nobody on the side of the people that were over there believed that was possible they thought that everyone was going to fold the moment the united states left well you didn't even have to think that you could see it you can see the provinces falling from january february march april may june july into august i mean you could watch it if you put it on the screen and show the provinces that fall i mean yeah you don't have to be nostradamus to figure out that hey this isn't looking so good and everything is converging here and you could extrapolate that oh
probably every province is going to fall um but once again what should they have done in that particular situation so you have a couple options one being hey maybe you could leave a small force at bagram perhaps to try to keep this military keep this intelligence service keep this government running maybe after 20 years i don't know how long you can sustain that but you could have done that and then if things aren't working out they're the last people to leave so that's one so you could you could have done could have done that or you get everyone out and leave bagram and it ends up being the same thing you see watch the whole government fall the leader left of course um but uh but now you're not leaving from a tactically disadvantageous position so you had essentially those two options to draw down to something a very small force um left there trying to keep that government going trying to keep that military going trying to keep that intelligence service going and then you could see how that works out or get everybody out in a way that makes sense what would be what would be a way that makes sense how do you get everybody out in a way that makes sense so bagram is there's a lot of standoff different distance at bagram airfield it's uh you can be there you can look out you can see people coming from a long way off we control that whole area you control the airfield it's not that chaos that we saw people hanging on the side of these planes as they're taking off you control that thing rather than the way we left at the airfield and essentially in town so yeah i don't know why we did that